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CaseNo.20070996-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

GEORGE BRIAN LEMIEUX,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for one count of possession of a
controlled substance, one count of theft, three counts of forgery, and one count of
theft by receiving stolen property, all third degree felonies. This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to three
concurrent and three consecutive prison terms of zero-to-five years?
Standard of Review. "Sentencing decisions of the trial court are reviewed for
abuse of discretion, including the decision to grant or deny probation and the
decision to impose consecutive sentences/' State v. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86,19,
110 P.3d 149, cert, denied, 124 P3d 251 (Utah 2005).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Defendant

with one count of possession of

methamphetamine, one count of theft, one count of theft by receiving, and ten
counts of forgery, all third degree felonies* R. 28-31. Pursuant to a plea agreement,
Defendant pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine, theft, theft by receiving,
and three counts of forgery; the remaining seven forgery counts were dismissed. R.
53-54, 56-64. After reviewing a presentence investigation report, the trial court
sentenced Defendant to prison terms of zero-to-five years on each count and
ordered Defendant to pay $5,000 in restitution. R. 70-77. The court ordered that
Defendant's sentences on the three forgery convictions be served consecutively. R.
71,75. Defendant timely appealed his sentence. R. 68-69.
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
On August 15, 2007, Defendant attempted to purchase merchandise at an
AutoZone in St. George by passing a forged check. R. 91:11-12. After the store
clerk refused to accept the check, Defendant left the store. R. 91: 12. He was
followed out by Detective Richard Triplett, who had responded to the store after
receiving a tip that Defendant was trying to pass a forged check using false
identification. R. 91:11. When Defendant walked to his car and opened the trunk,

1

The underlying facts are taken from the preliminary hearing and the factual
basis provided in the Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea. See R. 59.
i

Detective Triplett arrested him. R. 91:13-1 ^ 1*' Police discovered nv •• mphetamine and a stolen laptop computer in Defendant's possession during the course of
his arrest. R. 15-16,34. Further investigation revealed that Defendant had forged
multiple checks totaling more than $5,000.00 R 59.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
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three counts and to concurrent prison terms of nne-to-fiftepri ye.irs i mi the remaining
three counts. Defendant's claim fails at the outset because he ii i v ited any alleged
error. Both he and counsel acknowledged the inevitability of prison, and Defendant
told the court he would accept consecutive prison terms. In any event, Defendant's
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rehabilitative needs of Defendant. Finally, it cannot be said that the sentence was
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO PRISON
After reviewing the presentence investigation report (PSI) and hearing from
the prosecutor, Defendant, and defense counsel, the trial court sentenced Defendant
to consecutive prison terms of zero-to-five years on the three forgery convictions
and three concurrent prison terms of zero-to-five years on the remaining
convictions. R. 70-77. On appeal, Defendant contends that although he was
convicted of multiple charges involving multiple victims and "has a criminal history
dating back over approximately twenty years/' the trial court abused its discretion
in denying probation and imposing consecutive prison terms on three of six counts.
Aplt. Brf. at 5-6. This Court should not address Defendant's argument on appeal,
because he invited any alleged error. In any event, his claim fails on the merits.
A. This Court should not address Defendant's challenge to his prison
sentences, because he invited any alleged error.
In his handwritten statement to AP&P, Defendant said, "I do not want to go
to prison but will accept it for my actions." R. 65 (PSI): 4. And at the sentencing
hearing, his trial counsel said, "We understand incarceration is going to be required
because [Defendant] also has charges that he has yet to be sentenced on in Nevada.
So there will be incarceration." R. 92:6. Now, on appeal, Defendant contends that
"the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to prison rather than an

A

a l t e r n a t i v e siirh .vs pmL'Mti 'in " Apll Brf, nl h, I V'tvndcint's challenge In Ins p r i s o n
sentence should be rejected at the outset because lie invited the alleged t n i ir.
Under the invited error doctrine, a party cannot affirmatively lead a trial court
to believe that there is nothing wrong with a particular course of action, and •then
complain., on appeal that the court erred in taking that action. See State v. Winfield,
2006
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(declining to address defendant
erroneous because he invited any claimed error), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. State
v. Austin, 2007 UT 55,165 P.3d 1191. Here, both Defendant and Ms trial counsel
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to AP&P that he was facing sentencing in Las Vegas, Defendant said, "It would be
nice if all sentences ran concurrent but I do not expect this leniency, whatever the
outcome I will humbly accept my punishment/' R. 65 (PSI): 4. Accordingly, this
Court should also refuse to address Defendant's challenge to the consecutive prison
sentences.
B. Assuming arguendo Defendant did not invite the alleged error, his
challenge to the prison sentence fails on the merits.
Even assuming Defendant preserved his challenge to the prison sentence, the
record demonstrates that the trial court acted within its discretion in sentencing
Defendant to three consecutive prison terms of zero-to-five years and three
concurrent prison terms of zero-to-five years.
1. The trial court has broad discretion in its sentencing decision.
Subject to the limits prescribed by law, sentencing "rests entirely within the
discretion of the [trial] court/' State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210,1219 (Utah 1984). A
court may sentence a defendant to pay a fine, serve time in jail or prison, and pay
restitution. See Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(2) (West 2004). Where a defendant has
been found guilty of multiple felony offenses, the trial court may impose concurrent
or consecutive sentences. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (West 2004). Unless
otherwise specifically provided by law, a trial court also may sentence a defendant
to probation. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2)(c). However, the court is under no
obligation to grant probation, "and this is so no matter how unsullied [the]

reputation" of the defendant. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198,205,310 P.2d 388,393
(1957).
"[T]he exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal
judgment of the [trial] court." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). In
exercising that discretion, the trial court considers "many different ingredients,"
including

"rehabilitation,

...

deterrence,

punishment,

restitution,

and

incapacitation," as well as the "'intangibles of [a defendant's] character, personality
and attitude/" State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048,1051,1049 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting
Sibert, 310 P.2d at 393); accord State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, f 5,73 P.3d 991.
The court does not merely employ "a mathematical formula by which numbers of
circumstances" govern the decision. State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188,192 (Utah 1990)
(discussing aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the context of imposing
one of alternative minimum mandatory sentences).

Rather, the "weight of

circumstances are determinative." Id. Accordingly, "[o]ne factor in mitigation or
aggravation may weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale." Id.
"Because so many different ingredients factor into the sentencing process, and
because the discretionary imposition of probation rests in many cases upon
subtleties not apparent on the face of a cold record," a sentence will not be set aside
absent a finding that the trial court abused its "broad discretion." See Rhodes, 818
P.2d at 1051. This Court will not find an abuse of discretion unless the sentence

"exceeds that prescribed by law," State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987,988 (Utah 1986), the
trial judge failed to consider "all the legally relevant factors/7 State v. Schweitzer, 943
P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997), or the sentence is otherwise "inherently unfair/7
Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051 (emphasis omitted).
2. The trial court's prison sentence did not constitute an abuse of its
discretion.
A review of the record below reveals that the trial court did not abuse its
broad discretion in not granting probation and imposing consecutive sentences for
three of the six felony convictions.
The trial court's sentence did not exceed statutory or constitutional limits.
The court sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate prison term of zero-to-five
years on each conviction, which was the proper statutory penalty for the third
degree felony offenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3) (West 2004). Likewise, the
imposition of consecutive prison sentences was permissible under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-401 (West 2004). Defendant has not argued otherwise. See Aplt. Brf. at 3-6.
The trial court considered "all the legally relevant factors." Schweitzer, 943
P.2d at 651. Before imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court must "consider
the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4). Before
imposing sentence in this case, the trial court "received and read" the presentence
investigation report, which examined all these factors. R. 73.

The PSI discussed the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, summarizing
the facts of the case and identifying the victims. R. 65 (PSI): 3-4- The trial court
received additional information at the sentencing hearing regarding the losses
suffered by the victims of Defendant's check forgery scheme. R. 92:9-10. The PSI
discussed Defendant's history. It provided a brief biographical sketch, summarized
Defendant's educational pursuits, and observed that he suffers from a disability. R.
65 (PSI): 6-7. It also recounted Defendant's criminal record, his prolonged failure to
establish a permanent residence, and his inability to maintain any meaningful
employment over the previous two years. R. 65 (PSI): 6-8. The PSI assessed
Defendant's character and prospects of rehabilitation. It noted his history of drug
use, his past participation in drug counseling, and his claim that he did not need
further counseling. R. 65 (PSI): 7-8. The PSI concluded that Defendant was at high
risk to re-offend, given his lack of any "pro-social activities," his failure to establish
a stable residence and meaningful employment, and his poor score on the
sentencing matrix. R. 65 (PSI): 2. The report also concluded that Defendant's
prospects of rehabilitation were poor, where he had already served significant
prison time in the past, but continued in unlawful behavior. R. 65 (PSI): 4.
Finally, the trial court's sentence was not inherently unfair. A sentence is
inherently unfair "only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the
view adopted by the trial court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. For example, a sentence

Q

may be subject to reversal if a defendant "clearly show[s]" that the trial court's
sentence was based on "some wholly irrelevant, improper or inconsequential
consideration." Sibert, 310 P.2d at 393. Defendant has not made such a showing.
Defendant first complains that contrary to Form 4 of the PSI, "continued
criminal activity subsequent to arrest" was not an aggravating circumstance in this
case. Aplt. Brf. at 5. The trial court, however, was made aware of this mistake at
sentencing. Defense counsel advised the court that Defendant had been in jail since
his arrest. R. 92: 5. Moreover, the PSI did not otherwise suggest that there were
other charges pending since his arrest in this case. The PSI only indicated that
Defendant had previously failed to appear in a Nevada court for sentencing on a
felony drug offense, that he failed to participate in a presentence investigation
interview in that case, and that he was scheduled to appear in the Utah district court
for a fugitive review in connection with the Nevada case. R. 65 (PSI): 6. In short, the
trial court was well aware that Defendant had not committed any other crimes since
his arrest, but had instead been in jail.
Defendant next argues that Form 4 of the PSI inappropriately identified drug
involvement as an aggravating circumstance because "there was no evidence that he
had acted under the influence of a controlled substance or that drugs in any way
caused his criminal behavior." Aplt. Brf. at 5. Defendant did not make this specific
objection below, see R. 92: 5, and he has not argued plain error or exceptional

in

circumstances on appeal, see Aplt. Brf. at 3-6. Accordingly, this Court should not
consider Defendant's challenge on appeal. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.
5 (Utah 1995) (declining to review unpreserved claim of error absent request for
plain error or exceptional circumstances review).
In any event, Defendant's objection to the drug involvement aggravator lacks
merit. Although Defendant may not have been under the influence of drugs when
he committed the crimes, and although drugs may not have "caused" his criminal
behavior, Defendant's drug involvement was an aggravator nonetheless. Defendant
admitted that the forgeries were part of a drug distribution scheme to make money:
"[Defendant] explained that the merchandise he obtained by using forged checks
was then traded for drugs" and "[h]e in turn sold the drugs for money to support
him[self]." R. 65 (PSI): 8. Such drug involvement was properly credited as an
aggravating circumstance. See People v. Beals, 643 N.E.2d 789, 797 (111. 1994)
(recognizing as an aggravating factor in first degree murder case the fact that "the
incident was related to the sale of drugs").
Defendant also contends that a 2-point error in the PSI's Criminal History
Assessment resulted in an improper prison recommendation on the sentencing
matrix. Aplt. Brf. at 5-6. In that Assessment, Defendant received a total placement
score of 16 points, placing him on row V of the sentencing matrix:

11

CRIMINAL HISTORY ASSESSMENT
PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS
(Separate Cnmmal Convictions)

|
PRIOR MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS
(Separate Cnmmal Convictions)
(Includes DUI & Reckless, Exclude Other Traffic)

PRIOR JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS
(Adjudications for Offenses that would have been
Felonies if committed by an Adult)
(Three Misdemeanor Adjudications Equal One
Felony Adjudication)

0
1
2
3
4

None
One
Two
Three
MofelTi^TJ^t

VIOLENCE HISTORY
(Pnor Juvenile or Adult Conviction for an
Offense Which Includes Use of a
Weapon, Physical Force, Threat of
Force, or Sexual Abuse

4

1 st Degree Felony

None
One
Two to Four
Five to Seven
More Than Seven

WEAPONS USE IN CURRENT
OFFENSE
(Only When Current Conviction Does Not
Reflect Weapon Use or When Statutory
Enhancement is Not Involved

1
2
3
4
6

Const Possession
Actual Possession
Displayed or Brandished
Actual Use
Injury Caused

None
SUPERVISION HISTORY
One
(Adult or Juvenile
Two to Four
More than Four
Secure Placement

0 None
1 Misdemeanor
2 3rd Degree Felony

0 No Pnor Supervision
1 Pnor Supervision
2 Pnor Resident Placemnt
3 Pnor Revocation
Act Occurred WhifeUnder

SUPERVISION RISK 0 No Escapes or Absconding

1 Failure to Hmoti (Active Offense) or Ouistamilfig

k=~

16+ _ IV
~~
12-15
III
8-11
4-7
II
0-3
1
PLEASE CIRCLE THE CORRECT CATEGORY

2 Absconded from Supervision
3 Absconded from Residential Program
4 Escaped from Confinement

16

T O T A L PLACEMENT S C O R E :

CRIME CATEGORY
E
F
G
1st Degree
Murder

J 2nd Degree
|
Death

J
|

1st Degree
Person

|

3rd Degree
Death

I
|

1st Degree
Other

I 2nd Degree
|
Person

I
|

3rd Degree
Person

2nd Degree
Other

I
|

2nd Degree
Possession

I

3rd Degree
"

|

3rd Degree
"^"""~

wmmmmmm
18MOS

IV

Key

Imprisonment

Imprisonment

fmprisonrj
EfT&anctions

Intermediate
Sanctions

18MOS

16MOS

Regular
Probation

See PSI, Form 1. Defendant takes issue with the 8-point assessment for "Prior
Felony Convictions/' arguing that "the PSI was wrong in regards to at least two
prior felonies." Aplt. Brf. at 5. He contends that absent this mistake, he would only
have been assessed 6 points for prior felony convictions, which would "reduce [his]
point total... from 16 down to 14" and "place[ ] him on level IV instead of row V."
Aplt. Brf. at 5. He claims that "[t]his is significant because it makes probation and
not imprisonment the recommendation on the matrix." Aplt. Brf. at 5.

10

The record does not support Defendant's claim. In the first place, the PSI in
the record on appeal does not include the rap sheet which was included with the PSI
at sentencing and upon which AP&P relied in assessing points. Compare R. 65 with
R. 92: 3 (trial court noting that the PSI received by the court "had the actual rap
sheet attached to it"). Where the trial court was made aware of the conviction
discrepancy, see R. 92:4, and where Defendant has failed to include in the record the
rap sheet upon which AP&P and the trial court relied, he cannot claim error in the
conviction count. State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, <f 13, 69 P.3d 1278 (holding that
"when an appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, we presume the
regularity of the proceedings below").
In the second place, the PSI itself shows at least four prior felony convictions.
It demonstrates that Defendant had two felony convictions in Arizona—a class 3
felony conviction and a class 4 felony conviction;2 one felony conviction in
Nevada—the import or sale of a controlled substance; and one federal felony
conviction—the possession of a firearm by a felon.3 See R. 65 (PSI): 4, 6; R. 92: 4.
2

Although Section E of the PSI indicates that Defendant was "convicted of
two class 3 felonies and two class 4 felonies," R. 65 (PSI): 6, he asserted at sentencing
that he was only convicted of one class 3 felony and one class 4 felony, R. 92:4. The
convictions were rendered in one case, see R. 92:3, but the record does not disclose
whether the two offenses were committed in one single criminal episode.
The record indicates that Defendant served 57 months in federal prison,
which establishes that the offense was a felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006)
(felon in possession of a firearm); 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (2006) (defining felony offenses as
offenses with prison terms of more than one year).
ia

Accordingly, the assessment of 8 points for having more than three prior felony
convictions, and the resulting 16 point total placement score, was not error.
Even if Defendant dropped to a level IV on the criminal history row, resulting
in a matrix recommendation of intermediate sanctions, there was no abuse of
discretion in sentencing him to prison.

As stated on the Criminal History

Assessment Form itself, the recommendations on the sentencing matrix "are
guidelines only. They do not create any right or expectation on behalf of the
offender." PSI, Form 1; accord State v. Thomas, 2006 UT App 106U (holding that a
trial court is not required to follow the recommendations of a presentence report");
State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1300 (Utah App. 1989) (holding that "the
recommendations of the prosecutor or any other party are not binding upon the
court").
Defendant also argues that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the
following mitigating circumstances: (1) Defendant had been crime-free for a period
of five-to-six years; (2) the offenses were non-violent; (3) the offenses arose from a
single criminal episode; and (4) "lengthy imprisonment would severely compromise
his ability to make restitution." Aplt Brf. at 5-6. This argument lacks merit.
The weight accorded the mitigating circumstances identified by Defendant is
questionable, at best. Defendant had spent at least ten of his previous twenty years
of life in prison. See R. 65 (PSI): 6. Although he enjoyed a crime-free period of five

1 A

or six years, it ended in Nevada with his felony conviction for drug distribution- R.
65 (PSI): 6. Defendant then failed to appear at his sentencing, absconded to Utah,
and went on a crime spree here. See R. 65 (PSI): 3,6. Although his Utah crime spree
was not violent, it affected multiple victims and included, by Defendant's own
admission, the distribution of drugs. R. 65 (PSI): 3, 6, 8. Finally, imprisonment
would not, as Defendant contends, severely affect his ability to pay restitution,
where he was homeless and had been unable to hold down steady employment for
two years in any event. See R. 65 (PSI): 7. Given these circumstances, and defense
counsel's implicit acknowledgement that prison was inevitable, it cannot be said
that no reasonable person would impose the sentence adopted by the trial court. See
Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted November (3,2008.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General
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Cssistant Attorney Gener;
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